ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF BPK IN PREVENTING AND ERADICATING CORRUPTION (A STUDY IN 4 DISTRICTS IN SOUTH SULAWESI PROVINCE by Junaidi, Junaidi
205Asia Pasific Fraud JournalVolume 1, No.2nd Edition (july-December 2016) 
Junaidi : Analysis of The Role of BPK in Preventing.....
Page 205-213
ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF BPK IN PREVENTING AND 
ERADICATING CORRUPTION (A STUDY IN 4 DISTRICTS IN SOUTH 






Received July 31, 2015
Revised December 22, 2015












The objective of this study is to test the ability of  BPK (the 
Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia) in preventing and 
eradicating corruption in regional government (district). 
In this study, the examination is focused on the factors 
that affect the treasurers to commit fraud, especially in 
the financial management and financial transaction area, 
based on the fraud triangle theory. This study is based on the 
interviews with 87 treasurers and former treasures period 
2008-2012. The result of this study indicates that pressure 
and rationalization have a positive relationship with fraud. 
The result provides partial support for the fraud triangle 
theory in explaining the phenomenon of fraud. The role 
of BPK is as a strategic government auditor in preventing 
and combating corruption in regional government.
INTRODUCTION
Regional Government Financial reform is characterized 
by the enactment of Law No. 22 of 1999 on Regional 
Government and Law No. 25 of 1999 on Financial Balance 
between Central Government and Regional Government 
replacing Law No. 5 of 1974 on the principles of Regional 
Government and Law No. 32 of 1956 on the Financial 
Balance between Central Government and Regional 
Government in managing their own household. The 
reform occurred after the era of regional autonomy and the 
demands for professionalism of the government officials in 
managing the existing budget for the realization of regional 
government policies and goals set forth in the regional 
budget (APBD).
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Up to this moment the disclosures of 
alleged corruption cases in various regions 
with the number of suspects / accused / convict 
involving the legislative and the executive 
continue to grow. And these have been going 
on since 2002. Previous corruption reports had 
been dominated by the corruption in legislative, 
but recently there was increased tendency 
of corruption committed by the executive. 
According to the Director General of Regional 
Autonomy of the Ministry of Home Affairs, 
Djohermansyah Djohan, until January 2014 
there had been as many as 318 people of a total 
of 524 Regional Heads and Deputy Regional 
Heads stuck with cases of corruption. This 
occurred since the implementation of direct 
elections. Based on data from ICW (Indonesian 
Corruption Watch), in 2014 approximately 43 
Regional Heads became the suspects, and of 
course, these numbers continued to grow in 
2015.
It could be said that the phenomenon of the 
disclosure of so many corruption cases at the 
regional level has never happened in the history 
of Indonesia. Why? Some people assume 
that decentralization of policy has fostered 
corruption at the regional level. Rampant 
corruption cases have occurred shortly after 
the implementation of the policy of regional 
autonomy or decentralization of government. 
With the enactment of Law No.22 of 1999 on 
Regional Government, the regional government 
agencies have more power, especially in the 
budget management which has implications 
for the increased opportunities for corruption 
in the regional level.
As a government auditor, according to Law 
No. 15 of 2004 Article 16 (1) BPK is obliged to 
provide opinions, as professional statements of 
auditor, on the fairness of financial information 
presented in the financial statements. Criteria 
for the provision of opinions are: (a) conformity 
to the government accounting standards, (b) 
adequate disclosures, (c) compliance with 
laws and regulations, and the effectiveness of 
the internal control system. Based on the audit 
results of BPK (the Audit Board of the Republic 
of Indonesia), the biggest potential abuse of the 
regional financial management is in the weak 
internal control and noncompliance with laws 
and regulations.
Internal Control System
The audit results of the First Semester 
of 2014 showed 5,948 cases of weakness of 
internal control system consisting of 3 (three) 
finding groups, namely: the weakness of 
accounting and reporting control system, the 
weaknesses of budget implementation control 
system,  and the weakness of the internal 
control structure as presented in table 1.
 
Tabel 1 : Finding Group of Internal Control 
System Based on the Audit Result
No. Finding Groups Number 
of Cases
1 The Weakness of Accounting 
and Reporting Control System 
2,136
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Based on the audit results of BPK (the 
Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia), 
the weakness of regional government financial 
management is in the weakness of internal 
control and noncompliance with laws and 
regulations. As in Table 1, the dominant 
weakness of internal control system is the 
weakness of the budget implementation control 
system as many as 2,498 cases or 42% of total 
weaknesses of internal control system. These 
findings increased compared to the previous 
periods.
Compliance with Laws and Regulations
Non-compliance with Laws and Regulations 
results in losses to the state / region, potential loss 
of state / region, lack of revenue, administrative 
weakness, inefficiency, and ineffectiveness. 
The audit results of the First Semester of 2014 
showed 7,173 cases of non-compliance with 
laws and regulations with the potential losses to 
the state / region of IDR 10,928,527.26 million, 
of which there were indications of loss of state 
/ region, as many as 418 cases, amounting to 
IDR 400,659.93 million. The number and 
value of each are presented in Table 2 and the 
percentage of findings of non-compliance with 
existing legislation is in Graph 2.
Tabel 2 : The Finding Group of Non-Compliance with Laws and Regulations Based on the 
Audit Result
                    (Value in IDR Million)
No. Finding Groups Number of Cases Value 
Non-Compliance with Laws and Regulations resulting in
1 State/Regional Losses 2,790 1,464,508.48
2 Potential State/Regional Losses 431 4,668,797.17
3 Lack of Revenue 1,120 1,452,944.63
Sub-Total 1 4,341 7,586,250.28
4 Administration 2,512
5 Inefficiency 155 69,250,71
6 Ineffectiveness 165 3,273,026.27
Sub-Total 2 2,832 3,342,276.98
Total 7,173 10,928,527,26
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Graph 1 
Percentage of Finding on Non-Compliance with Laws and Regulations based on the Audit









Based on the regulation of BPK No. 01 of 
2007 on state financial audit standards, non-
compliance is different from fraud or deviation 
from the provisions of the legislation. The 
occurrence of non-compliance is not caused 
by fraud or deviation from the provisions of 
legislation. But in this case, non-compliance 
is an unreasonable action or beyond the usual 
practices.
Fraud, Waste dan Abuse 
According to Singleton (2002), the definition 
of fraud can vary depending on who defines 
it and how the condition of the person who 
defines it. One can define fraud as intentional 
fraud (including lying and cheating), and is 
the opposite of the truth, justice and honesty. 
Fraud has many definitions, among others are 
as follows:
a. Fraud is a criminal act that describes any 
dishonest act (cheating) to gain.
b. Corporate Fraud is the fraud which is 
committed by, for and against a business 
corporation 
c. Management Fraud is a deliberate 
misstatement by companies committed 
by employees within the company’s 
management with the aim of promotions, 
bonuses or other economic benefits, as well 
as status symbol.
d. Fraud, according to general public, is 
dishonesty in the form of deliberate fraud or 
intentional misstatement of a material fact.
According to GAO (Government 
Accountability Office) in Tuanakotta (2013, 
p: 30-31), waste is expenditure, consumption, 
mismanagement or potentially detrimental to 
the government. Waste includes unnecessary 
costs for practices, inefficient or ineffective 
system or control. Waste typically does not end 
on the accusations or charges of fraud. However, 
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the accusations or charges could happen. Waste 
will turn into fraud, if the elements of intent are 
found. 
Abuse, according to GAO, is destruction, 
misapplication, excessive use, or abusive or 
destructive deed. The abuse of authority is 
done by way of:   
1. Excessive or improper use of resources or 
the use of resources in a way that is contrary 
to the natural ways or statutory provisions;
2. Intentional destruction, diversion, 
manipulation, misapplication, maltreatment 
on the resources owned or managed by the 
government; or 
3. Extravagant or excessive use which gives 
rise to the abuse of position or authority;
4. Abuse does not necessarily lead to the 
accusations or charges for the occurrence 
of fraud. However, the accusations or 
charges could happen.
Fraud Triangle
Cressey (1953) states that fraud is caused 
by three factors: pressure, opportunity, and 
rationalization which are often called the 
fraud triangle. This theory has been adopted 
in auditing standards and is considered as 
one of the primary literature in explaining the 
phenomenon of fraudulent financial statements. 
Nevertheless, the ability of the theory to 
explain the phenomenon of fraudulent financial 
statements has not been empirically proven. 
Pressure is the pressure perceived by the 
perpetrator which is seen as financial needs 
that cannot be told to others. Opportunity is 
a chance to commit fraud as perceived by 
the perpetrators of fraud. Rationalization is a 
whisper to fight against the conscience of the 
perpetrators of fraud. Skousen et.al. (2009) and 
Dorminey et.al (2012) empirically examines 
the ability of fraud triangle theory in explaining 
the fraud.
Previous Researches
Alesina and Drazen (1991); Tavares (2004) 
and Mierau et al. (2007) found that the number 
of political parties can reduce the level of 
corruption, and when economic access is 
heavier that political access, people will enter 
the political arena to earn money and this can 
lead to the increased  political corruption and 
economic corruption. The less developed the 
political parties, the broader level of corruption 
because of weak supervision.. (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1993; Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000; 
Treisman, 2000; Agatiello 2010; Graycar and 
Sidebottom, 2012; Jetter, et. Al, 2015).
Dreher, Kostogiannis and McCorriston 
(2004) identified four factors as the causes of 
corruption, namely political and judicial factor, 
historical factor, social and cultural factor, and 
economic factor. Social and cultural factor is 
intrinsically related to moral behavior. People 
who have commendable moral qualities tend 
to abstain from acts of corruption. In making 
decision and implementing programs in a 
variety of activities, they tend to shy away 
from the actions that could harm others or other 
parties and vice versa.
According to La Porta (1999), Treisman 
(2000) and Alesina (2003), social and cultural 
factors play a special role in identifying the 
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level of corruption in a country. Religion and 
social system have an influence in suppressing 
corruption. Economic factor, such as economic 
openness (Dreher, 2006; Treisman, 2000), 
public sector in the economy (Tanzi, 1998; 
Treisman, 2000), and the level of remuneration 
in public sector (Rijckeghem and Weder, 1997) 
have a direct impact on the level of corruption 
in a country. Furthermore, Aguilera and Vadera 
(2008) distinguished typology of corruption 
based on the complexity and corruption practice 
around the world.
Henderson and Kuncoro (2012), who 
examined the flow of political parties in 
Indonesia, said that political parties are 
dominant factors affecting the level of 
corruption in a period and a region in Indonesia. 
Modus of fraud and corruption are committed 
by bribing the politicians and law enforcers as 
well as the bureaucrats in getting services.
Corruption in Indonesia
Arifianto (2004) stated that there are three 
theories that could explain the occurrence of 
corruption in Indonesia, namely mainstream 
economic theory, patrimonialism theory, 
and kleptocratic state theory. The first theory 
explains that the state often acts monopoly on 
the country’s economic activity. The second 
theory argues that corruption can act as a way 
to increase political integration among the 
peoples, parties and factions in the government. 
The third theory suggests that corruption is 
endemic in the regime controlled by the leaders 
of the country that have the purpose, by their 
positions, only to enrich themselves.
Harold D. Laswell, in the book “Who Gets 
What, When, How”, said: “Politics is the issue 
of who gets what, when, and how. Based on this 
opinion, the way a person gets a public authority 
is done with certain ways, for example, when 
a person obtains a public office using money 
politics way, in running his power he has the 
potential to commit acts that violate the law, 
such as corruption. Corruption is an unlawful 
act because it misappropriates public authority 
for certain interests.
Data Sources 
In this study, interviews were conducted 
with 87 treasurers and former treasurers in four 
Districts in South Sulawesi Province in 2008-
2012. The topics of discussion were about 
the factors that encourage the treasurers of 
expenditure, as the most responsible party, if 
BPK finds elements of fraud, waste and abuse 
in their financial management. Furthermore, 
the results of these interviews were confirmed 
to the Inspectorate and BPK.
DISCUSSION     
     
Graph 2:
Factors that influence the treasurer of 
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Based on the interview, in running the duties, 
80% of them feel burdened by the intervention 
of their direct supervisor and external parties 
such as family parties. This intervention may 
include a policy that violates the rules, such 
as the intervention to make payments to third 
parties that are not in the budget activities or 
the payments that exceed budget limit. Due to 
such violation, the treasurers of expenditure 
then make the accountability reports that do 
not meet formal and judicial conditions on 
other activities. 12% of indications of fraud 
action, based on rationality, show that some 
of the treasures do the same thing, while the 
remaining, the factor of opportunity, shows that 
not all budgets are used up.
The implications of this intervention are: 
realizing expenditure which is not supported 
by evidence of liability in accordance with 
provisions, marking up the budget, and 
creating fictitious activities and accountability 
report. Most budget items which are widely 
manipulated by the treasurers include official 
travel expenditures, grants, and social 
assistance. These fraudulent activities in 
accountability report certainly become the 
finding of BPK, either in administration, waste, 
or potential harm in the state/regional finances 
(indications of corruption).
The question is “How do the treasurers of 
expenditure address the findings of BPK? If the 
finding is only in administrative activities, such 
as the obligation to immediately pay / deposit 
the regional loss to the regional treasury, the 
treasurers generally use the remaining funds 
without accountability and use the reserve 
money because BPK usually makes an audit 
three (3) months after the fiscal year ends. As a 
result, the treasurers of expenditure manipulate 
the accountability report and increase the 
regular budget such as manipulation of the 
official travel evidence, irregularities of 
submission procedures, and disbursement of 
funds as well as the manipulation of the rest of 
the Regional Budget.
According to the rules of law, Parliament 
is the party that has a major role in following 
up the findings of BPK, because Parliament 
has monitoring function in the implementation 
of the Regional Budget. Being tied up by 
economic and political interests makes the role 
of Parliament less optimal because the regional 
head sometimes also serves as the chairman of 
political party that holds a majority of parliament 
seats. According to Rinaldi, Purnomo and 
Damayanti (2007), in some regions, the 
Parliament’s role in dismantling corruption is 
strong. It is due to political interests, in which 
the regional head is on the opposing party. In 
some places, one of the perpetrators of fraud 
also involves some members of Parliament.
Where is the Inspectorate? As long as 
the Inspectorate is still under the auspices 
of the regional head, the Inspectorate could 
not be expected to do a good job. Although 
this SKPD (Regional Work Unit) serves to 
conduct inquiries and investigations into 
alleged irregularities or abuse of authority, 
either through its own findings or through 
complaints or information from various parties, 
in carrying out its duties and functions SKPD 
is responsible to the regional head through 
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the Regional Secretary. Neither of the cases is 
revealed as a result of the report of Inspectorate 
(Inspectorate), a supervisory institution under 
the control of the regional head.
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
Conclusion
Compared with other law enforcement 
agencies such as the Attorney, the National 
Police and Anti-Corruption Commission 
(KPK), in preventing corruption, BPK has a 
very strategic role to carry out performance 
checks and specific goals that can support 
the disclosure of fraud, including corruption. 
BPK’s audit report could be valid records and 
supporting data to know the initial indications 
of corruption as well as preventive measures.
As the government’s external auditor, BPK 
should ideally not be too preoccupied by the 
audit monopoly, particularly on the compliance 
with the budget governance that seems never be 
completed. As a result, chronic and recurring 
governance error can never be fixed and even 
seem to be allowed, for example, in grant, 
social assistance and improvement of public 
services, such as licensing and payment of 
regional taxes.
One of the factors that have caused the 
proliferation of corruption over the years is the 
discretionary authority of BPK not to submit 
the findings of potential losses to the law 
enforcers when they have been returned. In 
fact, the BPK’s audit findings are much more 
qualified than public complaints in general. 
Audit findings on the result of fraud detection 
will facilitate the determination of the suspect. 
BPK can find risk factors that correlate with 
certain characteristics of the same examination 
object (corruption with variables existing in 
regional government).
Suggestion
The number of BPK members should 
not be too many much less the partisans who 
have no background in auditing. It is believed 
to have strong correlation with the quality of 
audit report. The argument is that BPK is a 
professional audit institution whose output is 
not a political product. The independence of 
BPK in recruiting personnel is strongly needed, 
because so far BPK has been dependent on the 
government as well as promotion policy. There 
is an impression that the independence of BPK 
is just a discourse. Political interest has been 
successfully reducing the performance of BPK. 
In the field of prevention, President, Ministry 
of Home Affairs and Ministry of Finance need 
to conduct monitoring closely so that the BPK’s 
recommendation for governance improvement 
could be obeyed. Laws even provide criminal 
sanctions when the BPK’s recommendation is 
ignored.
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